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Abstract 
The empirical findings on whether or not legislators vote strategically are mixed This is at least 
partly due to the fact that to establish any hypothesis on strategic voting, legislators' preferences 
need to be known; and these are typically private data. In this note it is shown that, under complete 
information, if decision-making is by the amendment procedure and if the agenda is set 
endogenously, then sophisticated (strategic) voting over the resulting agenda is observationally 
eguivalent to sincere voting. The voting strategies, however, are sophisticated. This fact has direct 
implications for empirical work on sophisticated voting. 
Introduction 
Over the past decade, considerable theoretical attention has been devoted to voting in 
committees. The focus has been on two related questions. First, given an arbitrary agenda, what 
is the structure and consequence of strategic (sophisticated) voting, and how does this differ from 
sincere (naive) voting? Second, given strategic voting and an arbitrary status quo, what final 
outcomes can a monopoly agenda-setter reach by an appropriate choice of agenda? For decision 
making under the amendment procedure 1 with complete information, the answers to these
questions are now known: see, in particular, Farquharson (1969), McKelvey and Niemi (1978), 
and Moulin (1979) on the first problem, and Miller (1980), Shepsle and Weingast (1984), and 
Banks (1985) on the second. 
In the wake of the theoretical advances, empirical work on legislators' voting behavior has 
become increasingly directed toward trying to discover whether legislators do in fact vote 
strategically (Bjurulf and Niemi, 1978; Enelow and Koehler, 1980; Enelow, 1981; Denzau, Riker 
and Shepsle, 1985; Krehbiel and Rivers, 1985). For if they do, then any legislator's voting 
behavior cannot be used unequivocally as an instrument to reveal his or her (legislative) 
preferences. The findings are mixed: this is at least partly because, as Krehbiel and Rivers remark, 
"to assess the voting strategies of [legislators] one needs to know [their] preferences" (1985, p.3), 
and preferences are private information. Bjurulf and Niemi, Enelow and Koehler, and Enelow find 
evidence of strategic voting, Denzau et.al. examine a case in which some legislators appear to vote 
strategically and others do not, and Krehbiel and Rivers are unable to reject the hypothesis of 
sincere voting. 
To account for legislators not voting strategically to promote their prima facie interests, Denzau 
et.al. extend the domain of individual preferences to "home style" constituency concerns. With this 
wider framework, they show that there are situations in which it is rational not to vote strategically: 
the cost of doing so in terms of the probability of reelection is too high. Because preferences and 
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motives are private information, constituents are unable to disentangle the reasons why a legislator 
voted in any particular way. Since they can never be sure that their representative was voting 
strategically or simply against their interests, legislators face a risk, when deciding to vote 
strategically, that constituents will believe the latter. The evidence that "home style" considerations 
are important in voting is strong (Kingdon, 1973). But the Denzau et.al. explanation is problematic 
in that it makes it even more difficult to test any hypothesis of strategic voting. If a legislator is 
observed to vote sincerely when there exists an opportunity to be strategic, it is prima facie 
impossible to reject the hypothesis of sophisticated behavior (relative to the broader domain of 
preferences): the unobserved "home style" costs may be too high. 
Krehbiel and Rivers estimate legislators' preferences and find that sophisticated and sincere 
voting coincide for the issue they study. Consequently, "failure to reject sincere voting does not 
automatically imply rejection of sophisticated voting" (p.26). They conjecture that, since the issue 
was one-dimensional and a median most-preferred outcome existed, a process of amendments and 
counter-amendments resulted in this median being proposed. Although the existence of a median 
on the agenda does not, in and of itself, guarantee that sincere and sophisticated voting will 
coincide, the suggestion is that the locus of strategic behavior may be more at the agenda-setting 
stage of the process than at the subsequent voting stage. 
In this note I show that this suggestion generalizes. If decision-making is by the amendment 
procedure. if the agenda is set endogenously. and if information is complete. then sophisticated 
voting over the resulting agenda is observationally equivalent to sincere voting. The voting
strategies which support the observed voting behavior, however, are sophisticated in the classical 
sense. The intuition behind the result is straightforward. Given an arbitrary agenda, a legislator 
knows that rational committee members will vote strategically. So the legislator takes these voting 
strategies into account when selecting a proposal or amendment to put on the agenda: proposing is 
"sophisticated". And given the structure of sophisticated voting on binary agendas, this results in 
3 
choosing proposals and amendments which defeat previously proposed alternatives under sincere 
voting. The class of agenda-setting procedures explicitly covered by the result is quite broad. 
Effectively, any mechanism satisfying the following three criteria fall within it: (1) legislators are 
given at most one opportunity to offer an alternative; (2) proposals are made openly within the 
committee; and (3) the agenda is set sequentially -- i.e. the sth. proposal on the agenda can be
offered only after the first (s-1) proposals have been fixed and before the (s+ 1)-to-final proposals 
are volunteered. 
In the next section, the model and the result, which is technically quite trivial, are developed 
formally. A final section offers some concluding remarks. 
Model and result 
The model is fairly standard. A committee N consists of an odd number, n;;::: 3, of 
individuals, N = ( 1, 2, ... , n}. Each individual i e N has preferences defined on the 
k-dimensional issue space, Rk: i's preferences are assumed representable by a continuous and
strictly quasi-concave utility function, ui : R
k � R. The committee makes a choice from the
alternative space, X (Rk :::> X), using simple majority voting over an agenda based on the
amendment procedure. An agenda of length t is a t-tuple y = (y1, Y2• ... , Yt) e x
t. The agenda is
based on the amendment procedure if the sequence of votes over the agenda is given by first putting 
Yt against Yt-1; putting the winner of this contest against Yt-2; and so on until Yl is paired against
the winning alternative in the (t-2)th. contest: the winner of this last contest is the final outcome.
Let l:(y) be the voting tree defined by this process. Hereafter, leave the dependency of 'LO on y 
implicit, and write l:(y) = Z:. 
The agenda is determined endogenously. The mechanism assumed is as follows.2 If there is
an historically given status quo, labelled b(O), then this occupies the position of y 1 in any agenda. 
Thereafter, alternatives are offered by eligible committee members in a sequence, 1t. Although all 
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committee members have voting rights, it is not assumed that all committee members are 
necessarily eligible to make proposals: agenda-setting may be confined to a subcommittee. Let M, 
N ::::> M, be the set of legislators eligible to offer proposals and amendments. Let IMI = m. 
The first legislator under 7t is chosen by some (possibly degenerate) lottery over M. Let 
PG= ii) be the probability in this lottery that legislator j E M is the first-ranked individual in 7t. 
Assume PG= ii) E (0, i],  'v'j E M, and IM p(-) = 1. Once the first-ranked individual is chosen,
he or she determines the second alternative on the agenda, Y2: call this proposal b(l). Once b(l) is
revealed, the second individual under 7t is selected by a second lottery from the remaining m-i 
eligible legislators, and this individual then determines y3, denoted b(2). In general, given the 
subsequence 1ts-i = (ii· i2, . . .  , is_ i), where ir is the r
th·-ranked individual in 7t, and given
proposals {b(O), . . .  , b(s-i)}, the sth·-ranked legislator is chosen by lottery from legislators in
M\{ i 1 • . . . , is-1 }, s = 2, . . .  , m. For any j E M\{ i 1 • . . .  , is-1}, the probability that j is selected to
make proposal b(s) is given by PG= isl 7ts-1) E (0, i]:  by assumption, I.M\{•} p(· I·)= 1 (so that
p(j =is I 1ts-i) > 0 for at least some j E M\{ ii· . . .  , is-1} ). So while the lottery at any stage s can
depend on the subsequence 1ts-i • it is presumed independent of the proposals { b(O), . . .  , b(s-1)}.
By convention, write p(j =ii)= p(j =ii I 7t0), 'v'j E M. By definition, 7t =(ii, . . .  , im) and 'v'j E 
M, 3s E {i, .. .  , m} such that j =is .
All the probabilities are common knowledge and can be used at each stage of the process to 
compute the likelihood of any given sequence, 7t, occurring. Let µ(7t I 1ts) be the probability that
the de facto sequence of proposers is 7t, given the realized subsequence 1ts, s = 0, . . .  , m
-1. For
example, if M = { i, 2, 3, 4, 5} and 7t2 = ( 4, 2) then:
µ((4, 2, l, 3, 5) I 7t2) = p(l = i3 I (4, 2))-p(3 = i4 I (4, 2, 1))·p(5 =i5 I (4,2,1,3)) 
= p(i = i3 I (4, 2))·p(3 = i4 I (4, 2, 1)). 
Evidently, µ(7t l 7tm-i) E {O, i} for all 7t.
At any stage s� i in the agenda setting process, if the sth. legislator (is) does not wish to offer
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any alternative at all or any not already proposed, then b(s) = 0 (where, by an abuse of notation, 0 
E X): under the amendment procedure, this captures the parliamentary rule preventing 
reconsideration of previously eliminated alternatives. The final agenda, then, is at most of length 
m+l � n+l and is given by b = (b(O), b(l), ... , b(m)). Once bis determined, voting proceeds 
according to the amendment procedure to arrive at the committee decision. 
To save on notation, given any subsequence 1ts, s � m, relabel individuals in N so that ir = r, 
Vr = 1, ... , s. For every s = 1, ... , m, let Bs = {b(O), ... , b(s-1)}. A (pure) proposal strategy 
for individual i E M is then a function: 
bi : x
i � (X\Bi) u 0 = Pi ·
For legislators j e N\M, define the (vacuous) proposal strategy, bj, by setting Pj = 0.
Let IL i be the number of possible pairwise contests identified by branches of the voting tree, 2:,. 
A (pure) voting strategy for individual i E N is a function: 
vi : L � {O, 1}
12:1.
In any pairwise contest, a value " l " denotes a vote for the alternative proposed later in the agenda 
(i.e. with the larger index under 7t), and a value of "O" denotes a vote for the alternative proposed 
earlier. 
Since a legislator will cast at most m votes during the voting process, i's voting strategy can be 
decomposed; viz. vi= {vit It= 1, ... , m}, where t indexes the voting stage (t = m being the final
vote). Legislator i votes sincerely at stage t ,  t = 1, ... , m, if and only if for any j > m-t: 
[ui(b(j)) > (<) ui(b(m-t))] => [vit({b(j), b(m-t)}) = 1 (0)].
If ever a legislator is indifferent and sincere at stage t, assume he or she votes surely for the 
alternative with the higher index under 7t (with endogenous agenda-setting, this turns out to be the 
unique equilibrium strategy (Banks and Gasmi, 1986)). Legislator i is said to vote sincerely if and 
only if i votes sincerely at ·every stage t = 1, ... , m. 
A (pure) strategy for legislator i is thus an ordered pair, cri =(bi, vi), i E N. Let cr = (cri)N and
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cr_i = ( cr1, ... , cri-1• O'i+l• ... , O'n)· Given any list of strategies, cr, let y(cr) be the final outcome
of the decision making process. The noncooperative solution concept used for the extensive form 
committee game induced by the structure described above can now be defined. An equilibrium is a 
list of strategies cr* = (cri*)N such that, '\ii e N:
.1) b(i)* = bi*O maximizes Eui(y((b, vi*), cr_i*)) over Pi• where the expectation operator Eis
with respect to the sequence 7t, 
.2) vi* = { vit*} is such that, 'Vt = 1, ... , m, conditional on i being pivotal at each stage t, vit *
maximizes ui(y((bi*• v), cr_i*)) over {O, l}
r�::1.
Because there is complete information and decision making is by the amendment procedure, in 
equilibrium legislators will adopt sophisticated voting strategies in the sense of Farquharson 
(1969), and McKelvey and Niemi (1978). So, taking this as given, it is enough to consider the 
agenda-setting stage of the game. 
For any policy x e X, define the win-set of x, W(x) = {ye X 11 {i : ui(Y) > ui(x)} I > n/2}, and
let wc(x) be its closure. If W(x) = 0 for any alternative X, x is a Condorcet winner. By the
assumptions on individual preferences, for any alternative x, W(x) is open. Therefore, if ever an 
individual is constrained to choose an alternative in W(x) and W(x) is nonempty, i's maximization 
problem is not well-defined. However, by the observation made earlier regarding equilibrium 
voting strategies for pairs of alternatives over which an individual is indifferent, the statement 
"maximize over W(x)" can always be replaced (without loss of generality) by the statement 
"maximize over WC(x)", which is well-defined. Hereafter, this is left implicit.
Theorem: Suppose there is no Condorcet winner in X. Then there exists a unique equilibrium cr* 
to the game, and the observed voting behavior of all legislators in equilibrium is sincere. 
Proof: To save on notation (and without loss of generality), set M = N. For any legislator j,
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define, 
QG) == [nW(b(s))] u 0, 
where the intersection is taken over all b(s) e Bj. Given 1tn-1 and Bn = { b(O), ... , b(n-1)},
legislator in offers the final proposal. Without loss of generality, set in = n. Hence,
bn *(Bn) E {b(n) E �n I b(n) E argmax.Q(n)un(b)}
is, given sophisticated voting, a best response for legislator n. Given 1tn-2• the individual offering
the penultimate proposal knows surely the identity of the final proposer, in (= n, by assumption).
Moreover, n's proposal strategy is uniquely defined. Again without loss of generality, label N so 
that in-l = n-1. Then legislator n-1 can do no better than to adopt,
bn-1 *(Bn-1) E {b(n:l) e �n-1 I b(n-1) e argmax.Q(n-l)un-1 (bn *({b} u Bn-1)) }.
Given 1tn-3' there are two possible de facto sequences 7t that can occur, depending on the outcome
of the final lottery over { n, n-1} to determine who proposes the penultimate alternative on the 
agenda. But whichever sequence occurs, the proposal strategies of the remaining proposers are 
well-defined. Therefore, individual in-2 (identified by assumption with n-2) has a best response to
adopt, 
bn-2*(Bn_2) e {b(ri-2) E �n-21 b(n-2) e argmax.Q(n-2)Eun-20L
where, 
Eun-20 = L1t µ(7t I 7tn_3)-un-2Cbm(7t)*(b(m-l)(7t)*( {b} u Bn-2)))
and m(7t) is the final proposer under 7t, etc .. Proceeding iteratively in the obvious manner, define 
analogous proposal strategies for all in-3• ... , i 1 · By construction, this set of proposal strategies is 
well-defined, constitutes an equilibrium, and is the unique such set. However, by sophisticated 
voting, for some Q(j), j's best payoff can be invariant across several feasible proposals, or none. 
Therefore there may exist several equilibrium agendas induced by cr*. 
In the equilibrium, voting strategies are sophisticated. Consider voting behavior along the 
equilibrium path for any agenda b*, derived from the specified proposal strategies. At the final 
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nonvacuous voting stage of this path -- i.e.b(s) vs. b(O), n � s � 1 and b(s) -:/:: 0 -- all legislators 
surely vote sincerely. Because there is no Condorcet winner, W(b(O))-:/:: 0 and such a stage exists. 
By construction, b(s) e W(b(O)), so b(s) = y(cr*) is the final outcome. Consider the penultimate 
voting stage in which b(l) is put against an alternative b(j)-:/:: 0, n �j � 2. Then, y(cr*) e {b(j), 
b(l)}. If there is no such alternative, we are done. So suppose there is a nonvacuous alternative. 
If y(cr*) = b(l), then, by the proposal strategies, W(b(l)) = 0 implying b(l) is a Condorcet 
winner: contradiction. Hence, y(cr*) = b(j). By construction, b(j) e Q(j). Clearly, any individual 
i e N for whom ui(b(j)) >max. { ui(b(l)), ui(b(O))} will vote sincerely at this stage. Similarly,
since b(l) and b(j) are in W(b(O)), any individual i for whom min. { ui(b(l)), ui(b(O))} > ui(b(j))
has sincere voting as a weakly dominant strategy here. Suppose i e N is such that ui(b(l)) >
ui(b(j)) > ui(b(O)). Then because b(l) e W(b(O)) by construction, i has a weakly dominant
strategy to vote sincerely. Finally, suppose i e N is such that ui(b(O)) > ui(b(j)) > ui(b(l)). By
construction, b(j) e w(b(l)) n W(b(O)) and b(l) e W(b(O)). So it is again a weakly dominant 
strategy for i to vote sincerely at this stage. Hence sincere voting over {b(j), b(l) }is a weakly 
dominant strategy for all individuals. By sincere voting at the final stage, definition of b(j) implies 
all legislators vote sincerely at this penultimate stage. Now apply an obvious inductive argument to 
complete the proof. II 
Corollary: Suppose there exists a Condorcet winner, x*, in X. Then there exists an equilibrium 
cr* to the game which is unique up to the proposal of x*. The observed voting behavior of all 
legislators in equilibrium is sincere, except possibly at voting stages up to and including the first 
vote involving x*. 
Proof: For any legislator j e M such that Q(j) -:/:: 0, the proposal strategy specified in the proof of 
the Theorem is the best response. Suppose there exists i e M and b(j) e Bi such that W(b(j)) = 0.
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Then Q(i) = 0. Set b(j) = x*. By a theorem of McKelvey and Niemi (1978), x* will be the final 
outcome under sophisticated voting whatever alternative i elects to propose. Hence, any proposal 
strategy is a best response for i. In particular, if b(i) "# 0 and b(i) e n{W(b(t)) I b(t) E Bi and
W(b(t)) "# 0} , then sophisticated voting along the equilibrium path need not be sincere. 
Moreover, by the argument for the Theorem, a necessary condition for voting not to be sincere at 
some stage for some legislator is that there be at least one such proposal b(i). The Corollary now 
follows from the Theorem. II 
The Corollary identifies the logically possible exception to the claim that, with endogenous 
agenda-setting, sophisticated voting is always observationally equivalent to sincere voting. Having 
said this, three points should be emphasised. First, the conclusion of the Theorem goes through if a 
Condorcet winner x* is not proposed, even though it exists (see below). Second, if x* is placed 
on the agenda then making no further proposals is equilibrium behavior, as is offering alternatives 
which can defeat (under sincere voting) all those previously proposed other than x*. In both these 
cases, voting along the entire equilibrium path will be observationally equivalent to sincere voting. 
Thus, even when there exists a Condorcet winner x*, there always exist equilibria to the game in 
which sincere and sophisticated voting coincide along the equilibrium path; and these equilibria are 
unique up to the proposal of x *. Third, in the spatial context at least, the existence of a Condorcet 
winner is generically confined to one-dimensional issues. 
Finally, note that if there exists a Condorcet winner x* in X, and if all legislators are eligible to 
propose alternatives (M = N), then x* is surely the outcome to the agenda game above. To see 
this, simply note that by Plott's (1967) theorem and n odd, there exists an individual j E N with 
ideal point x*. Therefore x* will be placed on the agenda 
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Conclusion 
If committee decision-making is by the amendment procedure, and the agenda is determined 
endogenously (either by a subcommittee or by the Committee-of-the-Whole), then the Theorem 
offers an explanation for why legislators are observed to vote sincerely. Furthermore, along the 
equilibrium path no individual will vote against his or her own proposal should this be put against 
an alternative offered earlier in the agenda-setting sequence.3 This explanation does not rest on
widening the domain of legislator preferences.4 Nevertheless, it is worth reiterating that the
observed behavior is supported by sophisticated voting strategies. In empirical work attempting to 
test for strategic voting, therefore, it is important to determine whether or not agenda-setting is 
endogenous. If it is, then, ceteris paribus, the Theorem predicts that a hypothesis of sincere voting 
will .not be rejected. 
As remarked in the Introduction, the key to the result is that sophisticated voting over an 
agenda induces legislators to confine their proposals to alternatives that can beat -- under sincere 
voting -- the proposals offered earlier in the agenda-setting process. Since the formal structure of 
sophisticated voting is invariant across the class of binary agendas (McKelvey and Niemi, 1978), 
this suggests that the Theorem holds not only for the amendment procedure, but also for any binary 
agenda and (binary) agenda-setting mechanism. 
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Footnotes 
*I am grateful to Richard McKelvey and to the referees for comments on an earlier version of this
paper. They bear no responsibility for any remaining shortcomings. This research is supported by 
NSF grant SES-8600965. 
1. Formal definitions of the amendment procedure and related concepts are given in the next
section. 
2. For related models of endogenous agenda-setting, see, for example, Banks and Gasmi (1986),
McKelvey (1986), Miller (1985), and Miller, Grofman and Feld (1986). 
3. Unfortunately, the observation that legislators behave as if constrained to vote for their own
proposals against those offered previously has not been formally documented. It is nevertheless a 
commonplace among students of Congress. In the case where a Condorcet winner, x*, has been 
placed on the agenda, a legislator can insure against having to vote for alternatives previously 
placed on the agenda against his or her own proposal -- if this is made after the appearance of x* on 
. the agenda -- only by proposing nothing, or by offering an alternative which beats all previously 
volunteered proposals other than x*. (Both constitute equilibrium strategies here.) Thus, if 
legislators, for whatever reasons, do feel obliged to vote for their own proposals against those 
offered previously, the logically possible exception to the claim that sophisticated and sincere 
voting observationally coincide with endogenous agenda-setting, identified in the Corollary to the 
Theorem, vanishes. 
4. A referee has rightly observed that, just as the model here excludes "home style" reasons for
voting behavior, it excludes similar ("position taking") reasons for proposal behavior. These may 
well prove important, giving rise to a distinct model of strategic agenda-setting. Having said this, 
there is in fact some room for position taking in the model here, as the Corollary makes clear. If 
there is an underlying Condorcet winner (x*) and if this is put on the agenda before all eligible 
committee members have made a proposal, then subsequent proposers can "position take", since 
whatever they offer will lose to x* under sophisticated voting. 
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